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In The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
BARBIZON OF UTAH, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GENERAL OIL COMP ANY, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE 
No. 11364 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to real property situate 
in Provo, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury, 
The Honorable Joseph E. Nelson, Judge. The Court granted 
Judgment quieting title to the real property in question in 
the Defendant, General Oil Company, after consolidating 
cases 29705 and 29707 for the purpose of trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Def end ant, General Oil Company, Respondent seeks to 
sustain the Judgment in favor of Defendants granted by the 
Lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This was an action brought by Plaintiff to quiet title 
to certain property situate in Provo, City, Utah County, 
Utah. Plaintiff is a manufacturer of ladies wearing apparel 
and it built a plant on the property in question in approxi-
mately 1947. 1230 North Street, or 12th North Street as it 
is sometimes called, runs East and West along the South 
side of Plaintiff's property and the Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad track runs generally North and South 
along the West side of the Southerly part of Plaintiff's 
property and along the West side of all of Defendant's 
property. This railroad track also runs along what is desig-
nated as 2nd West Street, Provo, Utah (Pl's Exhibit No. 8). 
The South line of Defendant's property is some 292.1 feet 
North of said 1230 North Street; it is bounded on the West 
by said railroad right of way and on the East by the prop-
erty of Plaintiff (Pl's Exhibit No. 8). It is this common 
easterly line of Defendant's property and the westerly line 
of Plaintiff's property which is in dispute. There is also a 
creek known as the Old Mill Race which runs in a general 
North-South direction in the area of dispute, but neither 
party claims such creek as a boundary line (Pl's Exhibit 
8. 
Neither party has claimed an established boundary by 
acquiescence nor was the theory of adverse possession ad-
vanced by either party. The action involves an intrpreta-
tion of the various conveyances by which the respective 
parties claim title and the extent to which the claims of 
title of each party are supported by a good and sufficient 
record title. 
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Both Plaintiff and Defendant claim record title from 
James Smith, original Patentee,, of the Southeast Quarter 
of Section 36, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, wherein 
the property in question is all located (Pl's Exhibit No. 1, 
page 1 and Pl's Exhibit No. 2, page 1). James Smith in 
1871 conveyed a parcel of this land to George Baum, De-
fendant's predecessor in title, the beginning point of said 
conveyance also tied to the center of said sction (Pl's Ex-
hibit No. 2, page 2). In 1887 James Smith conveyed another 
parcel of said quarter section to James A. Bean, Plaintiff's 
predecessor in title, the beginning point of which convey-
ance also tied to the center of said Section 36 (Pl's Exhibit 
No. 1, page 21). The Easterly lfne of said conveyance to 
George Baum and the Westerly line of said conveyance to 
James A. Bean were identical (Pl's Exhibit No. 11, TR 
59-61). It is the area of this common line which is in dis-
pute. Plaintiff contends that this record common line is the 
boundary between the parties and Defendant claims that 
the boundary line is approximately 65 feet farther east 
(Pl's Exhibit No. 11). 
Beginning with the conveyance of Administrator's 
Deed out of the Estate of George Baum, deceased, dated 
February 23, 1923, (Pl's Exhibit No. 2, page 9), the descrip-
tion of the property claimed by Defendant has tied to a point 
on the East right of way line of the Denver & Rio Grand 
Western Railroad determined in relation to the Southeast 
corner of said Section 36, with the result that the descrip-
tion of the property claimed by Defendant goes East of their 
record and basic title by 61.44 feet (Pl's Exhibit No. 11). 
All conveyances in Defendant's chain of title aft 0 r the 
one from the patentee, James Smith, tie to the Southeast 
corner of said Sction 36 and the East right of way of the 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad (Pl's Exhibit No. 
2) and Defendant claims that because said railroad is a well 
established feature upon the ground, it is entitled to use this 
f ea tu re as a basic point of reference. 
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The~e are conveyances to Plaintiff and its immediate 
grantor m the Abstract of Title which also tie to the South-
east corner of said Section 36 and a point in reference to the 
East right of way line of said railroad (PJ's Exhibit No. 1, 
pages 105 and 106; Def's Exhibit No. 12). 
ST A TEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND JUDGMENT OF 1 
THE COURT THAT DEFENDANT GENERAL OIL 
COMP ANY IS THE OWNER OF AND ENTITLED TO 
POSSESSION OF THE REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE 
AND DECREED TO IT BY THE COURT. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING, CON- 1 
CL UDING, AND DECREEING THAT DEFENDANT 1 
GENERAL OIL COMPANY IS ENTITLED TO BASE 
ITS TITLE AND DESCRIPTION TO THE REAL PROP-
ERTY IN DISPUTE UPON A SURVEY TIE TO THE 
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD 
RIGHT OF WAY LINE. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING 
THE EVIDENCE OFFERED IN CONNECTION WITH 
CIVIL NO. 19831 DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STA TE OF UTAH, BARBIZON OF UTAH INC. -vs-
STANFORD PATTON ET AL. 
POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUFFICIENT TO 
1 
SUPPORT THE CON CL US IONS OF LAW AND THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT. PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
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JUDGMENT AND DECREE, OR IN THE ALTERNA-




THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND JUDGl\.fENT OF 
THE COURT THAT DEFENDANT GENERAL OIL 
COMP ANY IS THE OWNER OF AND ENTITLED TO 
POSSESSION OF THE REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE 
AND DECREED TO IT BY THE COURT. 
Two preliminary points should be made: First, a so-
called "center" of a section is not included in an official 
government survey, whose smallest subdivision is a section, 
43 U.S.C.A. 751 (p. 61, Rules of Survey). This is consistent 
with Mr. Carr Greers testimony that only because of his 
prior personal work in the area of section 36 did it become 
possible in 1958 to make calculations determining the center 
of section 36. The patent in James Smith (dated 1870), 
however, measured from the "center" of section 36 with no 
other reference to landmarks or sction corners. It is thus 
not surprising that as early as 1923 the deed description 
of a quit claim deed in favor of Defendants predeces<1or in 
title was based on a survey tieing instead to the Southeast 
corner of the section, with reference to the right of way of 
the D.&R.G.W. (Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad), 
just as Plaintiffs deed descriptio~ number one, infra. does. 
A tie to the Southeast corner is correct according to U.S.C.-
A. 752: "First. All the corners marked in the surveys ... 
shall be established as the proper corners of sections, or 
subdivisions of sections which they are intended to designate 
. . . " The location of the section corner is conclusive on 
both parties, Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530, 70 P. 2d 154, 157 
(1937). 
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. Secon~, Plaintiffs deed contains two descriptions, the 
first (heremafter referred to as Plaintiffs description num-
b.er one) of which measures from the Southeast corner and 
ties to the D.&R.G.\V. Railroad right of way, and is analo-
gous to the description (the only description) in Defendanfa 
deed. A second description (hereinafter referred to a8 
Plaintiffs description number two) in Plaintiffs deed, is 
rot found in Plaintiffs chain of title, not in Defendanfa 
deed, nor in Defendants chain of title, and is dealt with 
further under Argument II. 
The first of two basic arguments upon which Plaintiff 
relies should be further explained. Plaintiffs claim is made 
possible by the expedient of positioning the "center of section 
36 according to Mr. Greers calculations and measuring from 
that point, following the metes and bounds, to plot the 
boundaries of the contested property. Over this Appellant 
then "lays" the property boundaries as found in Defend-
ants present Deed description, which measures from the 
Southeast corner and claims title to the almost inevitable 
overlap or discrepancy (TR. Bottom Page 76 and Top Page 
77). This method is necessary because there is no overlap 
or discrepancy between Plaintiff and Defendant on the basis 
of the original patent only; or, the current deed descriptions 
only (excluding Plaintiffs description number two). There 
are several reasons why the Court was correct in finding 
again~t Plaintiff and for Defendant. 
FIRST, the "center" of section 36 was not determined 
until 1958 and could have been of little practical value as a 
point of reference from which to pinpoint any specific spot 
within section 36. This being true, current reference to the 
"center" of section 36 C3.nnot be offered as dispositive of 
the intent of D2fendants and Plaintiffs predecessors in 
title. It is additionally evident from Mr. Greers evidence 
that his ability to calculate' the center of section 36 in 1958 
was largely a fortuitous event. He testified that he had work-
ed in that area for some years and for that reason had per-
8 
sonal notes on surveys of the other three corners of the sec-
tion which permitted the calculation. Absnt Mr. Greers 
records, the center of section 36 could not have been deter-
mined without a survey of the entire section. (TR. Pages 
7 and 8) It follows that most government-survey sections 
do not have a "surveyed center of section." Thus, if this 
Court were to allow Plaintiffs claim, an infinite num'oer of 
potential suits are made available to claimants willing to 
incur the cost of surveying hitherto undetermined centers 
of sections wherein they hold title to property. 
SECOND. surveys tieing to the Southeast corner of 
the section and to the D.&R.G.W. Railroad right of way are 
found in Defendants chain of title by 1923 and in Plaintiffs 
chain of title no later than 1946. This being thirty-five and 
twelve years, respectively, before the "center" of be sec-
tion was determined in 1958 it is evident that both parties 
relied on the definite and analogous descriptions frund in 
their deeds at the time they took title. In Affleck v .. Morgan, 
364 P. 2d 663 (1961) this Court declined to allow e ·;en the 
shift of a section line to displace parties who had relied on 
a prior survey. Which, suggests point three. 
THIRD, the survey by which Appellant calculates the 
"center" of section 36 (1958) is from twelve to thirty-five 
years junior to surveys upon which the current descriptions 
of both Plaintiff and Defendant are based. As pointed out 
in 11 C.J.S., 61, p. 633: "The general rule is that where 
the lines of senior and junior surveys conflict the lines of 
the senior survey control ." Thus, in Afflect v. 
Morgan. (Utah, 1961), supra, a senior (and incorrect) 
survey of a section line took precedence over a newer sur-
vey. Appellant accordingly should not be allowed to take 
advantage of the 1958 junior survey, and especially where 
th2 tie is to the prior, unknown, "center" of the section. 
FOURTH, the first description in the deed bv which 
Plainiff took title commences 100.0 feet from the intersec-
tion of a major road (twelfth North Street, Provo) and the 
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D.&R.G.W. Railroad right of way. Defendants deed de-
scription al~o com_mences at the D.&R.G.W. Railroad right 
of way which neither party denies is accurately located 
and which if used as described eliminates any substantial 
d_ispute between the parties. And, as Plaintiff so percep-
tively states (Appellants Supplemental Brief, pp. 6-7): 
"Whenever there is a conflict between courses and distances 
and boundaries or monuments, the former must yield to the 
latter." (emphasis added) The D.&R.G.W. right of way is 
a very accurately located monument, (TR. Page 31 and 32) 
and has been used as a major monument in Defendants 
chain of title from as early as the probate of the Estate of 
George Baum (who took from James Smith, The original 
patentee) in 1923. Monuments control over courses and 
distances, Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530, 70 P. 2d 154 (1937); 
Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 29 Utah 108, P. 382, 110 
Am. St. Rep. 666. Scott v. Hansen, 18 Ut. 2d 303, 422 P. 2d 
525; Bullion Beck & Champion Mining Co. v. Eureka Hill 
Mining Co., 36 Ut. 629 103 P. 881; Giauque v. Salt Lake 
City, 42 Ut. 89, 129 P. 429; Finlayson v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Co., 110 Ut. 319, 172 P.2d 142; 
12 Am. Jur. 2d, P. 548, Sec. 2: 23 Am. Jur. 2d, P. 287, Sec. 
250. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING, CON-
CLUDING, AND DECREEING THAT DEFENDANT 
GENERAL OIL COMPANY IS ENTITLED TO BASE 
ITS TITLE AND DESCRIPTION TO THE REAL PROP-
ERTY IN DISPUTE UPON A SURVEY TIE TO THE 
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD 
RIGHT OF WAY LINE. 
The second major claim of Plaintiff is based on the 
second description found only in Plaintiffs current deed 
(Plaintiffs description number two), but not in their chain 
of title, nor in Defendants deed, nor Defendants chain of 
title. The origin of this second description was never ex-
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plained: 
Q Now on the Sowards' (Plaintiffs) deed there is a 
second description added, which also describes it and 
it is b~causee, are you using the first description to 
plat this on, or are you using the second description to 
plat on the mark that you have here for Barbizon? 
A I am sure we are using the second one, they may 
both be platted there. They are both platted on there. 
Q All right, show me where in the Chain of Title you 
pick up this second deed description, which yo;, are 
using as a plat? 
A There is nothing in the Chain of Title. 
Q All right, it is just added? 
A Prior to this time. 
Q Prior to this time? 
A That is right. (TR 71, emphasis added) 
It can be observed that there was no objection to the 
testimony that the second description had been "added" to 
Plaintiffs description two was based (assuming there was 
a survey) is junior to that upon which description one was 
based. 
The basic description in Defendants deed can be found 
in a Quit Claim deed to Provo Brick & Tile Company dated 
March 8, 1923, making it clear that that survey as well as 
the one upon which Plaintiffs first description is based are 
senior and superior to that upon which the second descrip-
tion in Plaintiffs deed is based. Under this Courts holding 
in Affleck v. Morgan, supra, which is in complete agreement 
with the general rule of law that senior surveys are superior 
to junior surveys, Plaintiffs description number two would 
not qualify to displace Plaintiffs description number one, 
and certainly not Defendants description which is found 
as early as 1923. 
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There is in addition a fundamental error in Plaintiffs 
use of his second deed description. In order to create another 
discrepancy upon which claim is based, Plaintiff found it 
necessary to ignore the commencing point called for in the 
second description (the southeast corner of Plaintiffs par-
cel) and use what is labelled "point A" (Plaintiffs Ex. 7 
& 8). It is not entirely clear how "point A" was developed, 
although there is considerable evidence about fence lines 
in the area, as well as reference to the west boundary line of 
the Central Utah Vocational School as justification, even 
though Carr Greer testified he had not determined the 
Vocational Schools' boundaries and that there were con-
flicts and discrepancies in that area. It is clear that Plain-
tiff should not be allowed to arbitrarily pick a new descrip-
tion commencing point, thus creating discrepancies which 
otherwise would not exist. It should be noted that Carr 
Greer, while called as Plaintiffs witness had done all of the 
original survey work for Defendant and exhibits 7 & 8 were 
prepared for Plaintiff without reference to any deed descrip-
tions. (TR. Page 25) Plaintiffs entire dilemma is succinctly 
summed up in the following question and answer: 
Q But using the old railroad right-of-way line ((the 
common monument found in Plaintiffs descriptio11 
number one and in Defendants description)), without 
the flip-flop in the deeds from this point, to the point 
down here as you have described it ( (overlap or "flip-
flop" disc used supra,) ) and without taking advantage 
of this description, which is added for the first time in 
the Sowards' ((Plaintiffs)) deed, you cannot come up 
with that description that you have platted on the map, 
can you? 
A No. N 0 , the first description, of course, is to the 
east of the second description. (TR. 76). 
In addition, Appellants counsel constitute a house 
divided. In appellants first brief, argument is ~a~ed on the 
metes and bounds measurements found in the or1gmal patent 
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to James Smith, to which argument Defendants demonstra-
tion of established monuments in the form of the D.&R.G.W. 
Railroad right of way would be fatal. Appellants Supple-
mental Brief, however, which argues on behalf of the sec-
ond description in Plaintiffs deed is put in the position of 
having to defend the use of their new "point A" by means 
of fences, (TR Pages 75 and 76) which directly contradicts 
the position taken by Appellants in their first Brief. Plain-
tiffs surely should not be allowed to argue in favor of both 
sides of the same point at once. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING 
THE EVIDENCE OFFERED IN CONNECTION WITH 
CIVIL NO. 19831 DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
ST A TE OF UT AH, BARBIZON OF UTAH INC. -vs-
STANFORD PATTON ET AL. 
Answering Plainiffs Brief # 1 Point III, and Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Brief Point III, the best insight into this 
matter is found in the following questions and answers. 
Q Now Mr. Garrett, your company previously came 
into court in a similar situation involving this property 
of Stanford Patton's, did they not? 
A True. 
Q And that is a District Court case here, No. 19838? 
A I am well acquainted with it. 
Q And your company, as a matter of fact, in this case, 
had to pay off Mr. Patton, because of the title differ-
ential, is that correct? 
A We made a settlement with Barbizon, put it that 
way. They ultimately bought the property. 
18 
Q_ This same case that we are having today has pre-
viously been tried in this District Court as it affects 
the lower property, hasn't it? 
A That is true. 
Q And in that case, your company was required to 
reimburse Barbizon for what they lost by reason of the 
Stanford Patton title? 
A True. 
Q Now Stanford Patton stands in the same position 
as General Oil Company, except that General Oil Com-
pany's property is north, isn't that correct? 
A There is no similarity. The situation is just not the 
same. Patton had the same grantor as Barbizon, but 
General Oil did not. 
Q The descriptions come from the same point and are 
tied into the railroad exactly the same, in these two 
cases,. are they not? 
A I agree that is the case, but this is not similar. 
MR. FRAZIER : I am going to ask the Court to 
take judicial notice and I am going to ask the Court to 
look at Case No. 19838. 
Are you in Court today as an advocate? 
A No, I am impartial. 
Q I am just wondering since you have the title to this 
property insured, and you have already paid off on the 
lower property, do you remember what you had to pay 
Mr. Patton or what settlement you made with Barbizon? 
A The figure, of course, was rather nominal, because 
Barbizon were kind to us and as I recall, we paid the 
costs and the surveying, which was around $400., as 
I recall. 
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Q Well, I am just trying to test your credibility to see 
if you really are an expert today or if you are in here 
as an advocate in this action? 
A I consider myself an expert. 
Q Do you have a personal interest in the outcome of 
the trial? 
A I don't believe it involves us, I could ask the man-
ager. I don't believe they are asking us to pay the 
damages here. 
Q If Barbizon should lose the title, and Judge Nelson 
should find that General Oil Company is entitled to 
this property, that is in dispute,. your company would 
have to come in and reimburse Bar biz on for the title 
that they lost, wouldn't you? 
A As I recall,--
Q If they should come back against you? 
A As I recall, when we settled the Patton case, we 
got them to agree to settle the whole thing. (TR. P. 72, 
73, & 74) 
From the above it is obvious that using the railroad as 
the tie for the descriptions, the cases are the same and the 
title company has already paid Plaintiff for the land lost in 
the Patton case as well as the land they apparently thought 
they would lose in a settlement of "the whole hing." (TR. 
P. 74). 
The title company apparently thought they would origi-
nally only lose 15 feet to the defendant or their predecessors 
in title, whereas the surveys now disclose the actual amount 
of land in dispute is 65 feet (TR P. 75). 
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POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT. PLAINTIFFS 
MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CON CL US IONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE, OR IN THE ALTERNA-
TIVE, TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED. 
Answering Plaintiffs Brief # 1 points IV and V and 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief points IV and V. 
The Court obviously had sufficient evidence before it 
in the form of exhibits and testimony to justify the entry 
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law as signed by 
the trier of the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court below is amply supported 
by the evidence in the record. The evidence, as a matter of 
law, should not be reversed and the decreee quieting the 
title to the property in the defendant should not be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted 
LEON M. FRAZIER 
1005 West Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
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